LAW SCHOOLS AND JUSTICE
Alvin Esau, Professor of Law, University of Manitoba
(Revised version of a talk given at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association of Law
Teachers at Windsor, Ontario, June 6, 1988.)
I. INTRODUCTION
Law schools, whatever other objectives they may have, are places where students are educated
for the practice of law. We know too that law schools have struggled to actualize the idea that the
best education for the practice of law is not a narrow focus on imparting information about legal
concepts and helping students to acquire a set of functional legal skills, but rather that the most
practical education is a wide focus on understanding the law, legal institutions, and lawyering in
relationship to the philosophical, economic, political, and social forces that constitute the legal
enterprise in the first place. There are still students, lawyers, judges, and even some law
professors who would prefer that law schools not take their university setting seriously, and that
they should instead just narrowly present the law as if it were a cake to be eaten, rather than
deconstructing the cake into the ingredients of milk, eggs, flour, and so forth to understand how
cakes are made. For some, "theory" and "higher learning" is still just optional icing on the cake,
rather than the ingredients of the cake itself.
Often lost in this debate about how best to provide an education for the practice of law is any talk
about justice. What has the law school got to do with justice? In my view, law schools should be
institutions devoted to justice education, and also places that embody justice in terms of
relationships between students, staff, applicants, alumni and the wider community. If we believe
that the practice of law should really be a vocation of justice, and that lawyers should be ministers
of justice (in secular religion terminology), than the law school must take justice seriously and
stop treating it as mere icing on the cake of doctrine, skills, and even explanatory theory. I make
this statement the way I make the statement that I actually believe in God and real human
experiences of God and that this belief is the ground for meaning in my life. The statement about
justice in law school and the statement about belief in God are alike in that failure is often the
reality for me rather than fulfillment of the belief. I sometimes go through long periods of disbelief
and even cynicism about my teaching of law or writing about law as having anything much to do
with justice (or the existence of God).
Despite my own feelings of failure after ten years of teaching to contribute much of anything to
the law school as a forum for justice education, I want to make some remarks about three matters
having to do with law schools and justice: The critical teaching of law, the contextualization of
law schools, and the law school as a caring community. Obviously there are many aspects of this
subject that I have left out. For example, I am not directly going to deal with the publication of
scholarly research by law professors, which is a crucial aspect of law schools and justice. Legal
academics can serve to create a more just legal system by writing about the injustices they see in
the law and providing suggestions for reform. Furthermore, legal academics do not just exert their
influence indirectly by what they teach their students who then go forth and act in the world, but
rather legal academics are often directly involved in law reform commissions, government
tribunals, law society deliberations, courts, and law firms, and the like. However, in my remarks
today I want to concentrate on some factors of justice in relationship to the role of the law school
in the education of students for the practice of law.
II. CRITICAL
obviously if we are going to take justice questions seriously in law schools, we must teach law
critically. I mean by this that we must as teachers and students constantly evaluate the law, legal
institutions, and lawyering practices that we are studying. Evaluation means that we have some
standards of value, some standards of good and bad, worse and better, that we measure the law
against. If we present the law as a bundle of rules, principles, and concepts that are simply there
and given, without critical evaluation of them, we teach our students to focus on legality and not
on morality and justice. We are suppose to be interested in justice and yet we have very little to
say about it. The evaluative measure of law becomes law itself, which is no measure at all, but
rather the collapse of justice into mere legality. Rather than evaluating law in terms of standards
of justice, we turn the tables and measure justice by the standards of law. Uncritical legal
education simply reinforces the status quo.
The uncritical study of law has a direct impact on how students will come to view not just law but also lawyering. The lack of moral discourse in law schools means that students can more easily adopt the ideology that it is right to do anything for your client, however harmful to others or to society, so long as you stay within the law. Students can easily adopt the ideology that the prime task of the lawyer and the legal profession is to know the law and apply it, rather than adopting the ideology that the prime task of the lawyer and the legal profession is to struggle to make our law just. Students can more easily adopt the ideology of separating their personal morality from the role morality of lawyering. Students can more easily believe that the existing legal norms are fine, good, or the best we can
have, by uncritically assuming the legitimacy of common law evolution, or "democratic"
legislative authority. The perception that legal education does have the effect of killing what
reformist ideals entering law students have, has not been proven or disproven by social-science
surveys of law students, but I think the perception is a true one nevertheless.
This point about the need for critical evaluation of the law and how the study of law directly
relates to lawyering ideology is obvious and has been made endlessly. So why is it that we often
feel we are still failing miserably at achieving a critical understanding of our subject? Perhaps we
are still slaves to the "coverage" mentality, where we must roar through the whole field of
doctrine, leaving little time for any evaluation of it. Perhaps we fall into the trap of viewing
conventional legal reasoning and the presentation of legal doctrine as somehow "hard" and
intellectually acceptable to the students, while policy and morality arguments are "soft" and
completely subjective and resisted by students as a waste of classroom time. Perhaps we have lost
our own sense of vision for what should be, for what values should be advanced in the law, or at
least we lack the courage to explicitly present our views.
However, another factor that sometimes limits the law teacher from embarking seriously into evaluative discourse is the fear that somehow he or she will now be accused of impermissible indoctrination. This fear is just a simplistic avoidance mechanism. We all know that values are considered to be culturally bound, subjective and relative, but we still
must make commitments to visions of the self and society; we still must make choices, and we still
have a community of moral discourse in which we confront others and are in turn confronted by
them about what is right and wrong. I view my task as a teacher to be truthful about the subject of
law as I see it. I am not there to train students to uncritically conform to expectations set by the
profession. Training in conformity is not education. If I believe that students should be critical of
law and lawyering, than the place to start is for me to be explicit about what I view as good or
bad in the law and why I think so. What interests do I think the law is advancing at the expense of
other interests? What and whose are the values that shape the law and how does the law in turn
shape our collective values? To be truthful to your vision of things does not mean you must be
disrespectful to those who have a different vision, but it does mean, it seems to me, that you
present your vision rather than pretending that law is somehow ever neutral and apolitical. It is the
teacher who does not critically examine the moral issues always present in the legal doctrine who
might be said to be engaged in the "indoctrination" of the whole conventional value scheme
contained in the doctrine.
The movement to more critical teaching can actually make the law school a more pluralistic and
open forum and result in less "indoctrination" than is the current practice of largely uncritical
legalism based on conventional liberal ideology. We are experiencing some very interesting times
in legal scholarship with the fragmentation of the liberal consensus and the rise of Critical legal
studies, Feminist legal studies, and the post-modern Judeo-Christian legal studies movements.
Law schools should have professors who do not all conform to the old liberal consensus, but who
represent different points of view. It is ironic to me that the legal establishment which is wedded
to pluralistic liberal individualism is sometimes now trying to bar the door to the new voices in
legal education, and at the same time, some of the new voices that actually are questioning the
virtue of liberal pluralism must appeal to it for legitimacy of place in legal education.
I am willing to admit that there is more going on than this fairly uncontroversial picture of law
teachers with different ideologies being truthful and letting the chips fall where they may. This
picture is not so controversial because it conforms nicely to our conventional ideology. Each
individual is morally autonomous and speaks his or her mind respectful of everybody else's right
to agree or disagree, but we do not really try to influence anybody, especially given our power as
a teacher, because that might violate the student's individual moral autonomy. Expression is
valued, asking the right questions is valued, stimulating discussion is valued, but the exercise of
influence is dismissed as impermissible. I believe that there is truth to the view that the way we
treat our students is a model for the way that our students as lawyers treat clients. We know that
lawyers sometimes dominate and manipulate clients, so we properly avoid such behaviour toward
our students. But I think we have actually missed the boat when in reaction to impermissible
hierarchy, domination and manipulation in the lawyer-client relationship we move to an uncritical
acceptance of certain extreme conceptions of individual autonomy instead.
I value community as much as I do individual autonomy. In many respects we find our individual selves only in relationships with others. Communities shape us and we shape the community and we do not just focus on our own freedom and responsibility but we focus also on the shape and quality of the overall community. We care what others are doing in the community and not just with our own freedom to do what we want. This means that moral discourse is more than isolated individuals expressing individual opinions as if they were simply discussing preferences for certain styles of clothes. Moral discourse in community includes real confrontation and real caring about what we all think and do, even if we ultimately affirm the right of the individual person to make their own decisions. In this context I believe that we should honestly affirm that we not only express our evaluations of the law, but we also attempt to influence others in our community; those who read our writing, other lawyers, judges, and law professors, and the students we teach. To say this means of course that we are open to be influenced by others in turn.
My point is that we can still be respectful of each other's autonomy while not denying that we
exercise influence over each other. We should be properly concerned about the authoritarianism,
the power and control that lawyers exercise over clients, and that law professors exercise over
students. But at the same time, let us not deny influence or seek not to have it. I admit that for
those of us who are highly critical of the present legal arrangements and lawyering institutions and
practices in our society, it is easier to accept and acknowledge this influence because we are in the
minority. Our influence seems to be very small. Our influence is but a counterweight to the
overwhelming majority opinion. We are even marginalized by being called the prophets crying in
the wilderness. We hardly need to fear that we are pressing our case too strongly.
Another problem that arises whenever we talk about a more critical legal education is that we
inevitably begin to debate the nature of law in the first place. If we understand that legal discourse
is not ever autonomous from political and moral discourse, we cannot avoid the critical questions.
If we assume that in fact the legal enterprise does not and should not operate with a coherent
distinction between law as it is separable from moral questions of what it ought to be, we cannot
avoid the exploration of values in legal education. But I want to address those teachers of law
who may lean more in the direction of formalism in the sense that they view law as a mass of rules
and principles with a distinct legal pedigree that can be found and applied with a considerable
degree of certainty and predictability to human affairs. There are of course also harder cases
where the pre-existing law does not determine the result without recourse to so called extralegal
factors. The teacher who leans in the formalist direction, may actually think that he or she may
teach law by simply explaining what the law is and exploring the boundaries of where the law ends
and where the open questions begin. The teacher does not suggest to the students that the
questions of what the law ought to be are unimportant, but says that the course does not deal with
this. It is something for the students to consider on their own time, while the course is simply
about learning the law that we have.
Such a position it seems to me has a direct ideological impact on students, not just about the nature of law, but also about the nature of lawyering. The teacher is approaching the subject with a classic role differentiation mentality. There is a purported separation of the personal and the professional. The teacher's own story and own values and visions are separated out and treated as irrelevant to the task of explaining the law as it exists. The student's own values and visions are also excluded in effect by suggesting that the law can be
studied and applied through a process of reasoning that excludes moral and emotional matters.
The message to the student is that lawyering is like that. You adopt a role morality as a lawyer
that need not be connected in some fundamental way with your own or ordinary morality. The
student already starts the process of wearing the legal mask over his or her real self in law school,
instead of finding ways in which lawyering can be deeply expressive of his or her own visions of
self and society.
While I reject much of the formalist model of law, my point is that even the formalist teacher
should teach law critically, even though that seems a contradiction in terms given my different
view of the nature of law. Rather than turning to policy in the classroom only when you have a so
called hard case, it is obvious that the law that you consider to be present with clarity and
predictability is still a law that expresses a value, that brings about a state of affairs in the world.
The values expressed by the law and the states of affairs that the law brings about should be
critically evaluated. This is not only essential if we are to take issues of justice seriously, but it
also helps remove the pervasive sense of alienation that students can have when they bifurcate the
study of law from their own deepest aspirations. The terrible sense alienation that comes from
excluding feeling and emotion and turning exclusively to dry rationality in the study of law. The
ultimate death of real caring in the student, as law and lawyering become unconnected with
visions of the self and society. Caring only comes when we have a relationship to the subject that
matters to us in some fundamental way. What ends up mattering is marks and marketability, not
understanding and justice.
Finally, in talking about the critical study of law we must turn to clinical legal education. Even
though I have no experience with clinical teaching, I do teach a course in professional
responsibility and I am concerned about how that course correlates with my student's clinical
experiences. It seems to me that clinical programs and skills courses can actually provide
uncritical socialization into conventional patterns of behaviour, rather than critical education
about lawyering, despite the prominence given to education for professional responsibility as a
motivation for such programs. Indeed, the great educative power of these courses as we
acknowledge the strength of learning by doing, means that the clinical program can be particularly
influential for good or bad.
I will ask some questions rather than imply that in fact our clinical programs are taught
uncritically. My point is that such courses could by approached with as little evaluative content as
one finds in substantive law courses. For example, the student may really face the ethical problem
of having a client whose goal is not just, who should really loose the case and not win, but do we
really accept any other options about lawyering in the clinical setting, other than ultimately
persuading the conscientious student to accept the conventional liberal due process model of
client autonomy within an adversary system and the lawyer's amoral role of zealously advancing
the client's goal, rather than taking personal moral responsibility for the ends of advocacy? Or
perhaps we do talk about the justice of providing legal services to those who are poor in a system
where legal services are allocated disproportionately to the powerful in our society, but then when
it comes to the means of lawyering rather than the ends, do we teach every trick in the book as if
lawyering for those we love justifies the instrumental use of questionable tactics? Do we teach
skills critically or do we teach them instrumentally? Do we critically evaluate the values embedded
in different ways of interviewing, counselling, negotiating and advocating, and evaluate the ends
to which skills are used? Do we critically evaluate the structures and styles of different law firm
communities and practice settings?
So my first point is that if legal education is going to have something to do with education about
justice, we must teach law critically- constantly evaluating whether legal practices are just or not.
In terms of being critical, I do not want to leave the impression that critical must be equated with
negative. I want rather to say here that by critical I mean evaluative. More than likely, we will not
just be subversive in the sense that we view some legal practices as wrong, but we will also be
conservative in the sense that we have a positive evaluation of some practices that we think
should be conserved. The point is that we should be subversive or conservative rather than simply
being conformists by teaching law uncritically.
III. CONTEXT
Another way in which legal education fails to take justice seriously is to teach law without
contextualizing it. This point is obviously directly linked to the previous discussion of critical
teaching. We tend to divorce law from the concrete consequences of the law and the social
settings in which law is derived and applied, and often misapplied or not applied at all. This lack
of contextualization may lead students to view law as an abstract, almost game like, process of
intellectual argumentation rather than seeing law as a fundamental part of the construction of our
actual world in which law is used for evil ends as well as good ones. The lack of contextualization
for legal study helps to feed the attitude that lawyering involves the uncritical service of individual
interests rather than the taking of moral responsibility for the social impacts of our work as
lawyers in terms of what interests we advance and what interests we do not serve. One of the
attractions of the clinical program is that students are exposed to contextual aspects of law and
lawyering generally absent in much of the rest of the law school experience. However we need to
contextualize law and lawyering throughout the curriculum and extra-curriculum of law school,
and not just leave this for the clinic.
While much more could be said about contextualization, I want to consider for a moment, not so
much the contextualization of law but the contextualization of the law school itself. To a degree,
the campus context of most law schools is itself worthy of note in terms of our failure to take
justice seriously. I have always been attracted to the campus. Whenever I visit a city, I go first to
the university and walk through the campus and perhaps browse through the bookstore. My wife
does not quite understand why I do this in priority to visiting the art galleries, the museums, the
zoo, the shopping areas, the parks, and other more obvious spots of interest to tourists. Probably
I am drawn to the campus because it often strikes me as a kind of garden of eden that we can stay
in despite the fact that we have bitten the fruit of the forbidden tree, which is the feeling I got
recently when I visited the beautiful campus of the University of Washington in Seattle. Lecture
halls, labs, and libraries, well tended lawns and gardens, students and staff lounging about at lunch
time. This is a world that somehow gives me a sense of comfort and belonging, in a way that I
never get in the downtown world of office towers. I am a professor after all, and not a downtown
lawyer. But I often have an experience of the so called "ivory tower" isolation of my life on
campus. After visiting the campus in Seattle, I drove along Martin Luther King street through a
ghetto and this was not a garden of eden but more like a jungle. When I visited Columbia
University in New York I got the sense that the campus was an armed camp in the middle of the
Bronx with steel gates and bars and security guards protecting every entrance to the garden in the
midst of a jungle war zone.
So I spend my time at the campus and I live near the campus and most of my friends are connected to this same world. We do not live in opulence, but we have a comfortable income and we have a privileged life. A life in which we read, write, reflect and teach, and we do this basically on our own terms, on our own schedules, and according to our own interests, at least if we have tenure. But the campus does not just exist for itself, but rather it exists for the betterment of self and
society. Life in the garden can easily desensitize us to the reality of the jungle world, despite our
pretensions of being especially well informed as students and scholars. When we think about law
schools and justice we must, it seems to me, find ways of bringing the reality of the jungle into the
garden if we are going to contribute at all to the making of a better world.
What I am suggesting is that most of us do not adopt some grand theory of justice so that we can
articulate in a coherent way what a just community would look like. Indeed the concept of justice
seems to be particularly riddled with complexity and perplexity. Rather we start negatively with
the experience of specific injustices rather than positively with a general theory of justice. Justice
is not so much an ideal state that we conceive but rather justice is the continual struggle of
making and hearing complaints about wrongs that are done, and responding with ideas and
actions about what to do about these wrongs. Justice is not even rooted in having good rules that
govern society, but rather justice is relational, rooted in how we treat one another. Good rules are
not the root of justice but rather the result of justice rooted in right relationships. Law then must
be rooted in love. Justice involves both the systemic and the personal. Justice is something we
give each other and not just something that we get or not from the government.
Thus, it seems to me that the experience of wrongs done, the listening to the cries of the victims,
the telling of stories, the awareness of our own relationships and complicity, is essential in the
bringing of the jungle to the garden or in coming to see that the garden has its own jungles. In our
comfortable garden we need to hear the cries of the victims and only then can we take seriously
the question of how these injustices might be dealt with and what role law has in the upholding or
the removing of injustices. In the law school environment, however important it is for students to
be exposed to Mill, Rawls, Nozick, or other justice theorists, it is more important for students to
actually be exposed to the reality of exploitation and domination through exposure to the actual
cries of the victims of racism, sexism, economic and educational deprivation, violence, and so
forth. The study of court decisions, however compelling the facts may be at times, remains largely
a study of abstractions, rather than the story of real live human beings.
There may be a host of ways that the jungle could be brought to the garden or ways that we place
our students into the jungle. I only make a very modest suggestion here. I like the idea of a law
school day devoted to recollections of the treatment of the Japanese Canadians during the Second
World War and the contemporary demands for at least some compensation for that unjust
treatment. I like the idea of a law school day devoted to the history and persistence of patriarchy
in our society, or a day devoted to the exploration of injustice in South Africa, or a day devoted
to the stories of crime victims and the stories of convicts, and so forth. Perhaps such special days
devoted to panels, films, discussions, and readings on selected issues will have the effect of
trivializing some of the issues rather than bringing the student's mind and emotions to them, but I
think it is worth a try. Most of our students are privileged and often blind to the structural web of
injustices in our society and world and they are prone, I believe, to view the deprivations of others
as being simply a result of misfortune rather than unfair, unjust actions and conditions in which
law plays a central role. It is first the recollection and reality of injustice that must be presented if
we are to acquire any sense of responsibility and resolve to do anything as lawyers to serve justice
rather than just manipulate law on behalf of those who already live in gardens. Presenting "high"
theories of justice that stretch your head is a worthy part of law school education, part of our life
in the garden, but I believe that exposure somehow to the "low" reality of the screams of the
victims in the jungle that tear at your heart may in the end provide the more important education
that law schools should help provide.
So my second point is that to take justice seriously, we need not only more normative-evaluative
discourse, but also more data, if you will- an expanded sphere of what it is we are looking at in
law school. Not just appellate decisions, doctrinal and theoretical- interdisciplinary perspectives,
but also stories- films, novels, biography, and real people. Justice is about life, and is not a subject
bounded by a bundle of legal rules and principles.
IV. COMMUNITY
If justice is rooted in relationships, than obviously the law school itself is not just a place where
education about justice takes place, but is itself a place where justice is done or not. Much can be
said about this dealing with everything from admissions policy to alumni relations, but I will
comment on only a few aspects of law school as a caring community in terms of staff, students,
and society generally.
If justice is to be taken seriously; if we are to treat people with respect and care, than the law
school itself must foster a greater sense of community. While I hardly view law schools as
anything like the organic community of Mennonites in which I grew up, and indeed while I
actually resist the idolatry and narrowness that comes from attempts to form holistic communities
around something so partial as professional commonality, I find at the same time that law schools
are too isolating and alienating. Perhaps when a new school is born there is a sustained sense of
togetherness for a time, but after decades you may end up with basically the lone ranger model. I
teach my courses, write my stuff, have a few friends, remain cordial to those I run into, but is
there any real commitment and concern for the law school as a whole? Often we do not know
what others teach, what others think or write, or what students as a whole go through. We have
stopped caring about much more than our own subject matter and our own scholarly career.
Some law professors have even stopped caring about that, as they settle into a routine of drawing
a pretty hefty salary for the bare minimal contribution of showing up for class.
I think we really lack collective responsibility for the whole law school experience which we shirk
off to Deans to worry about. Indeed we fear community because real community will create a
host of conflicts to deal with creatively and with justice. We want cordiality and the absence of
conflicts; the nice placidity of being left alone to do our own thing. Is it any wonder then that
when our students graduate they often have no continuing commitment or identification as alumni
to the law school? They were given no real power and responsibility for its shape when they were
law students and law school is seen as a stage for the pursuit of individual careers rather than a
fundamental part of the legal system.
A more caring community among the professors must set the stage for a more caring community
between students and between students and staff. When I started to teach, I thought that I would
really get to know my students in a more holistic way rather than simply knowing most of their
names by the end of the term. What a failed vision that has been in the crunch of trying to get
prepared for the next class and get through it! We want our students when they are lawyers to
treat the client as a person and not simply as a legal problem coming into the law office. Yet our
lack of holistic concern for our own students as persons feeds into the narrow legalistic
conception of what lawyering involves.
How is it possible to have any more holistic relationships with students in the context of large
classes and within the time demands of all the other duties we have? It seems to me that one small
matter that could be improved is that we need at least to know more about each other if we are
going to start treating each other with more concern for the whole person. When I started to
teach, I could go to the files and find a transcript of the student's prelaw educational program.
That did not tell me much about the student, but at least I knew that someone had majored in
math or whatever. Apparently now even these transcripts are unavailable to anyone but the central
university admissions officers. My suggestion is that we should require an autobiographical essay
from everybody entering law school and from all the teachers, with an explicit demand that such
an essay would be shared not just with the teachers but with all the other students who are
entering law school. Is this an invasion of privacy within the typical liberal individualist mentality
of our world, or is this a legitimate step in the direction of fostering a caring community in law
school? A place where we come to see that sensitivity to others and self understanding are part of
the lawyering process.
A caring community in law school can be a paradigm for the care we need to have as lawyers for
the community outside of the law school and the profession. If we are going to take justice
seriously, we must examine the way in which rank leads to remoteness from those who we are to
serve, and the way in which rank cuts us off from truly listening to the stories of injustice in our
society. The hierarchy and oppression that may be involved in the way we treat our students
legitimates the hierarchy and oppression in society generally. I think law schools feed into and
foster the pervasive sense of superiority and status that professionals often have over the so called
laity, and also the stratification of the profession within itself. Pride of place rather than solidarity
with others cuts off the root of justice. Elitism geared in the direction of special social
responsibility is often the message, but the reality is an elitism that is self-servingly content to
conserve inequality.
In this regard my own story can be told with some shame. My parents were poor immigrants who
came in their youth to Canada in 1926 in a flight from the ravages of civil war, famine, and
religious persecution in Russia. My parents never had a high school education. My father was a
farmer for most of his life and then he became a clerk in a store. There were seven children in the
family and my mother not only looked after us but cleaned other people's houses to supplement
the family income. We always managed and we were taught to work hard and do all things well.
We all went on to university. The family now contains a teacher of music, a teacher of theology, a
teacher of law, an elementary school teacher, a professional historian, and so forth. This is a very
typical story, a story involving the different places in society of countless first and second
generation Canadians. There are many aspects of my life that I cannot deny are in fact better than
my parent's situation. Better in terms of life options, in terms of fulfillment of talents, and certainly
better in terms of economic security. There is a sense of some kind of a climb up one rung in the
ladder of life, but that sense also holds within it the seeds of poison.
When I was accepted into law school, and much more so when I graduated from law school in my
extreme youth (a plea of mitigation), I actually do have to admit that I thought of myself as in a
superior class as compared to most of the rest of my fellow human beings. I even considered
myself to have earned this superior status rather than falling into it by some process of birth or
luck. I was somebody now. A member of a profession that had power and status in society. I
expected deference from lower mortals. My identity was partly wrapped up in this sense of rank.
If the bank teller or the travel agent or the secretary treated me like an ordinary schmuck, I would
say I was a lawyer and just watch the deference flow. Despite our being told that the public image
of lawyers is really quite negative in terms of perceptions of what we do and how we do it, we all
know that our society nevertheless has a deeply rooted ladder of status on which certain
professions like law are highly placed. This sense of rank really feeds into remoteness from and
removal from those who are on the lower rungs. The law school experience did nothing but
reinforce the perception that we were superior creatures. Everything from the hubris of the law
teachers to the protection of the law library carrels from being used by mere mortals other than
law students spoke of special privilege.
Many law students move from law school into the large or medium sized law firms where this
sense of superiority may be particularly reinforced. They now have an office in the upper floors of
a highrise and look down at the world, they dress nice, have tastefully and expensively furnished
offices, eat lunches at the best restaurants. The whole working environment speaks of wealth and
power and privilege. Despite being at the lowest end of the pole when they enter as articling
students, they already feel that they have made it, that they are part of the olympian class
compared to the common folk on the Portage Ave. bus. I noticed when I was at Harvard, that this
process already took place for most students in second year of law school as they were wined and
dined, escorted through the impressive displays of offices and private club affiliations, and courted
by an array of perks during the hiring process.
Law teachers are in a strange position in terms of all this talk of rank between the profession and others, and within the profession itself. Law teachers in Canada do not rank very highly in the overall stratification of the legal profession itself. Furthermore, law teachers are defensive about their status within the university given that most of us do not have a doctorate which is a kind of badge of rank that seems important within the university setting. It may be that this defensiveness actually makes us more status oriented. We think of the law school as a special and superior place within the university and seek special privileges of salary, teaching load, freedom from regulation, and so forth, rather than really identifying ourselves with the larger university.
What I am saying is that the attitude I had when I graduated from law school is an attitude that I
continue to see in many students and that we help to perpetuate in law school. An attitude of
superiority that legitimates the idea that we deserve more power than others, that we deserve the
highest incomes, that we deserve to be deferred to. You might say that everyone has a legitimate
and basic need for self-esteem and that the pride of attaining a law degree, even the pride in the
ideals of lawyering, is quite affirmable. But we also desperately need a good dose of the "great
reversal" which is at the core of Jesus's teaching about the Kingdom of God. The first shall be last.
The real lords and leaders shall be the servants and slaves. The weak and humble shall know
power and wholeness. Pride and self-righteousness cut us off from the love of neighbor and it is
this love that sums up all the law and the prophets.
How might the law school environment foster a sense of identification with others rather than
superiority over them? This is a question I pose rather than answer. I think that part of the answer
includes the need to broaden legal education itself by admitting more students and hiring more
professors who have themselves come from a situation of being more likely the victims of injustice
as women, poor persons, natives, or whatever, rather than confining legal education
overwhelmingly to the children of middle or upper class privilege. Still, my own children are very
middle class and then some, and yet I do not want them to be labelled as insensitive to justice
issues just because they were born to a privileged class. So we should not assume that the rank
and remoteness of lawyers is necessarily associated with the class backgrounds of law students to
begin with.
Another factor that could be looked at is the way that the law school fails to provide much of any
opportunity to understand the variety of legal practice contexts available upon graduation. Who
do you want to serve as a lawyer and how do you provide a service to the community by your
lawyering? Students seem to go through the articling interview process at the law school with
little sense of what kind of law they want to practice or in what context they want to practice it.
Instead of this, there seems to be a kind of hierarchy of prestige related to the size of the firm or
whatever, and students then rank the offers they receive on this scale. Less conventional practice
settings that are more likely geared to helping the less powerful rather than the most powerful,
like public interest law departments, legal aid offices, government services of various kinds, and
small storefront lawyers or small town lawyers, and so forth, are often not part of the interview
process or the positions that are available are filled, not because of a genuine commitment to the
justice of practicing law in that setting, but by default in not getting an offer for a more
prestigious position. The law school needs to provide students with insights into different sorts of
practice settings. We might start at least with a series of special lectures and panels about practice
in smaller communities, practice in the large law firm, practice in the legal aid office, and so forth.
We need to at least provide alternatives to the view that the best lawyers and the best lawyering is
done in corporate and commercial large law firms.
Many aspects of what we do in law school are implicated in this sense of fostering rank. One
small matter, for example, deals with our evaluation of students, and the imposition of the grading
curve. If I teach a small seminar course to 10 students, it must be conceivable that the subject
matter might actually become so interesting to the students and that my teaching might actually
become so stimulating, that the students all might perform to the level of an A. Yet if this
happened, I likely would not be allowed to give them all A's, because they must be graded against
each other, rather than against some external standard of actual performance apart from the
ranking of one against the other. The use of the mandatory curve is a message to the students, not
just about competition and hierarchy, but also about marketability and marks. We become more
interested in marks than we are about the material to be learned, because the law school ranks
everybody by marks as one of the primary ways in which jobs after law school are given out. The
law school can also focus on marketability rather than educational value by joining forces with the
profession to emphasize certain courses in the curriculum as marketable ones, as ones that an
employer finds attractive on a resume, while other courses are devalued as being too "soft" or too
"policy oriented", and so forth.
So my third point is that the law school itself should be a place where justice in not just the topic
of study but rather that justice must be experienced in the school itself in terms of the character of
the community in relationships of staff, students, and the larger society.
V. CONCLUSION
I have only touched upon a few of the issues involved in taking to heart the belief that law schools
should be communities of justice and for justice. Beliefs are easier to articulate than to act on. My remarks are not aimed at
other targets than myself. My teaching has been uncritical and uncontextual, and I have not done
much to foster a caring community within the law school. I am also prone to set the ideals aside
and just get on with whatever is passable and popular. Like so many other children of the sixties, I
am tempted to resign myself to the apparent futility of seriously battling for social change and
accept instead the apparent benefits of just finding meaning in life in the strength of family,
friends, and my own freedom from want to do whatever I will. Yet I can't seem to let go. It is as if
there was a God and he/she was exerting some kind of gravitational pull to prevent me from
escaping the call to justice. The prophet Amos after listing a host of injustices perpetrated on the
poor, the sojourners, the widows and orphans, and the needy in his society, a society that
celebrated its prosperity, power, and wise social principles, said:
Take away from me the noise of your songs;
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