CHAPTER IV

TYPOLOGY OF REPATRIATION

The previous chapter introduced two main categories of influences on refugees during their repatriation decision-making process. These two categories are *events in exile* and *events at home*. It has been demonstrated how the interplay between events at home and events in exile affects the repatriation decision-making process. This chapter expands on the decision-making model, leading to the development of a complete typology of refugee repatriation. The purpose of this new typology is to determine whether a particular repatriation is voluntary or involuntary. The primary determinant of voluntariness is a comparison between the degree of control the refugees or external agents have over *events at home* and *events in exile*.

While the use of the terms events at home and events in exile are appropriate in a general discussion of refugee decision-making, they require some clarification prior to the introduction of the typology. Events in exile specifically refers to the refugees' immediate social context, the things that they perceive and feel each day in the asylum area. For the development of a typology, the broader term social context is more appropriate. The term more clearly refers to the interplay between a variety of social factors that affect the every day lives of refugees. In the model of information and decision-making, the term events at home refers specifically to events affecting refugees' home areas. For the discussion of the typology the scope is slightly broadened to external context, which can include factors outside the home area that have a meaningful effect on the repatriation process.

The terms *social context* and *external context* form the foundation of the new typology. What follows is an examination of both contexts and the manner in which

they affect refugees prior to their possible repatriation. Following this examination, the typology of repatriation is derived and its four principal categories described.

SOCIAL CONTEXT

The three elements of refugees' *social context* that are central in terms of a possible repatriation are: kinship ties, economic status in exile and security in exile. Together, these three elements form the background of refugees' daily lives and these elements directly affect the outcome of a repatriation decision. While in each individual refugee situation, one factor may be more important than the others, the extent to which the refugees have control over their entire *social context* directly affects their decision to return home.

Kinship Ties

For most refugees, the central unit of organization is the immediate family forming a single productive unit (Harrell-Bond 1986, p. 6). Especially in exile, most refugees seek to maintain ties between family members, as well as members of their kin group. Whether the refugees are settled in camps, or are self-settled, the family remains a central focus of refugee life. A survey of Mozambican refugees in Malawi revealed that seventy percent of the refugees in camps lived with their nuclear families (Makanya 1992, p. 15). The remaining refugees lived in various types of extended families. The settlement of refugees in nuclear families is frequently used by aid organizations as the basic unit for the distribution of relief aid. In this type of situation, smaller families tend to benefit by receiving a larger per-capita proportion of supplies.

The makeup of refugee families is frequently distorted by the absence of adult male refugees in the home. Often male refugees are forced to seek employment outside the refugee settlement (De Wolf 1994, p. 2). Elsewhere, men may be involved in fighting in the conflict that initiated the refugee flow. Female-headed households

abound in many refugee situations. It is estimated that together women and children make up at least eighty percent of the refugee population in the world (Martin 1995, p. 45).

Central to the issue of women and repatriation is the problem of information. In many African cultures, men traditionally make important decisions for the entire family. Refugee situations can transform entire societies and frequently alter the traditional roles of men and women (Brazeau 1995, p. 66). In the absence of a male head-of-household, many women are left on their own to make important decisions regarding repatriation. Elsewhere, women are traditionally left out of the decision-making process and are not given control over their decision to return home or remain in exile.

Outside the context of the immediate family comes the extended family or kin. Most refugees settle along side members of their own clan or with a similar ethnic background. The importance of kin relationships varies from one refugee situation to another. While in some instances, such as the flights of refugees from Rwanda or Somalia, kin relationships were very important; elsewhere such as the flight from South Africa, they were less important. Refugees who fled the conflict in Somalia frequently lived in clan-centred settlements. Clans formed the background of social organization before and during the refugee crisis. Some NGOs working with these refugees centred their relief and development strategies on the two enduring features of Somali life, the clan and the market (Ryle 1992b, p. 22). By focusing on these two important institutions, NGOs were able to provide a link for the refugees between home and exile.

Economic Status in Exile

The second component of refugees' *social context* is their economic status. From the outset, refugees experience difficulties in finding sufficient means of supporting themselves. Chambers (1982, p. 386) notes that one characteristic of nearly

all refugees is that they are instantly impoverished. Refugees who have recently arrived in a settlement area generally have only what they could easily carry with them during their flight. The refugees frequently have abandoned the tools with which they formerly made their living, as well as the animals upon which they relied for food.

As noted above, refugees frequently rely on one or more member of the family working outside the household for cash, in order to support the entire family. Using labour migration as a means to earn money is not always possible or even legal for some refugees. Despite this, many refugees risk leaving their settlements to work illegally and usually cheaply, sometimes far from their settlements. Where refugees live in closed settlements, or are located in isolated areas, there are usually few opportunities to obtain wage labour.

Because of their vulnerability to being shut out of the labour market, refugees' economic contexts are among the most easily controlled. If host governments are eager to speed up or even force a repatriation, then they can begin with the removal of any economic rights or opportunities for refugees. The sudden termination of employment opportunities for refugees can devastate the micro-economy of an entire refugee community. The insecurity caused by the removal of economic opportunity can be enough to cause some refugees to consider returning home.

Central to the economic context of most refugee communities in Africa is the availability of land in order to produce food. In the past, when refugee populations were smaller, or land was abundant, many refugees were provided with small parcels of land to cultivate for themselves (Kibreab 1985, p. 70). However, increasing pressure on land and water resources have altered the way in which most African refugees are settled. Increasingly most African states are not providing the vast tracts of land they once did for refugee settlement (Rogge 1993b, p. 26). Recent refugee migrations to Kenya and Zaire demonstrate that governments are unwilling or unable to provide land for refugees to cultivate. Refugees who do not have access to land lose their primary source

of food and income. The control of access to land is a central issue in any refugees' social context.

Security in Exile

Refugees flee their homes because they feel insecure. Ideally, they settle in a place where they no longer fear for their lives. Unfortunately for many refugees, security in exile is as unobtainable as it was at home. Refugees are frequently the target of harassment by locals, governments, armed liberation fronts, or even by other refugees. In several instances, such as Ethiopian refugees returning home from Somalia in the early 1990s, refugees have had to flee an emerging conflict in their country of exile (Scott Villiers and Dodge 1995, p. 162.). Elsewhere, insecurity in settlement areas, combined with a reduction in food aid or services have been enough to make refugees feel insecure. The return migration of Somali refugees from Kenya was brought about by such a combination of events (Waldron and Hasci 1995, p. 68).

Security in exile is one context over which the refugees have little direct control. Ideally, the protection of refugees is one of the major undertakings of UNHCR (Hocké 1989, p. 44). Refugees are supposed to be protected from harassment by governments, political or armed fronts. In reality, in some cases, UNHCR does not have the means or the power to provide protection for refugees. Sometimes refugees are left to the whims of governments, who may not perceive refugees as a group worth protecting.

Refugees have a day-to-day interest in their security situation. Having fled at least one conflict already, refugees are alert to any threats that could dislocate them anew. A lack of continued security while in exile can be sufficient grounds for some refugees to either seek a new place to settle in exile, or in certain circumstances to be forced into an unwanted return migration.

Other Social Contexts

Outside of the three major contexts outlined above, other facets of refugees' lives directly affect the voluntariness of their repatriation. The issue of vulnerable groups of refugees, those particularly at risk during repatriation, must be addressed. The social contexts of these groups of refugees can be easily manipulated before repatriation. Therefore special care must be taken in order to ensure that refugees in these groups are provided with a free choice to return home.

Vulnerable refugees may include: women, children and unaccompanied minors, as well as elderly and handicapped persons. People in any or all of these classifications may require additional information and assistance before repatriation. Women refugees often repatriate on their own, or are accompanied only by their young children. During the potentially lengthy return trip, women refugees can be subjected to harassment, robbery or sexual abuse (Brazeau 1992, p. 4). Children and handicapped refugees are at greater risk of contracting illnesses during or after their return trip. These refugees often return to areas where health care facilities are sub-standard or non-existent, so their health conditions may remain untreated for extended periods. Ideally, a well organized repatriation program should include vaccinations for children, as well as health checks for other refugees potentially at risk (Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children 1992, p. 28).

The UNHCR uses screening procedures during repatriation registration in order to identify those vulnerable refugees who might require extra assistance (UNHCR 1993f, p. 55). By using NGO partners who have local experience with selected vulnerable groups, UN agencies can target assistance to the refugees who need it the most. For example, the Mozambican repatriation plan identified several types of vulnerable refugees. NGO-based assistance is recommended for unaccompanied children, sick and handicapped refugees, dependent children, unaccompanied women and elderly refugees. (UNHCR 1993a, Annex VI).

Determination of Social Context

The typology of repatriation divides the *social context* into two halves: *controlled* and *free* (Figure 4.1). These two measurements are not absolute, they can vary between individual refugees and between individual contexts. The purpose of this classification is not to provide an absolute division between whether the refugees lives are free or controlled, rather the measurement is intended to provide a general outline of their entire *social context*. When, on balance, refugees have control over their own economic, security and family life, then their *social context* can be considered *free*. On the other hand, when external agencies or forces have the most input into all aspects of the refugees lives, then their *social context* could be classified as *controlled*.

Social Controlled Free Social Context

Figure 4.1 Social Context

EXTERNAL CONTEXT

The second half of the contextual equation is the *external context*. This context consists of elements not directly affecting the refugees' daily lives, but which still have an important effect upon the voluntariness of their repatriation. In more traditional repatriations, the *external context* consisted almost entirely of elements in the home areas. In the last fifteen years, host nations have an increasing effect upon the *external context* and the repatriation process. As with the *social context*, the extent to which the elements of the *external context* are controlled or free determines whether or not the repatriation is in fact voluntary.

Because the number of variables that are not directly controlled by the refugees varies more widely from one refugee situation to another, some greater generalization of the *external context* is required. The three major *external* variables are: security at home, infrastructure and the economic status at home.

Security at Home

The primary pre-condition for the start of any truly voluntary repatriation is the improvement of the security situation in the home area. Having fled a conflict, refugees generally have little interest in returning home if conditions that have not changed appreciably for the better. At the same time, the issue of security at home is largely out of the hands of the refugee population. Significant changes to the overall security situation are usually the product of political changes at home. Ideally, once these changes have begun to take root, the security situation may improve enough to allow refugees to consider repatriation.

Recently, there has been considerable debate about the apparently voluntary decision of refugees in some situations to return home to areas despite the absence of political settlements to conflicts that would provide long-term security. Some refugees seem to be taking risks in order to return home to areas that are not secure. Stein and Cuny (1995, p. 27) state that: "Many refugees, confronted with the harsh reality that no durable solution is offered to them, will explore the possibility of going home. Many of these returns will be spontaneous- refugee induced with little international assistance-and will occur during conflict. Refugees will *voluntarily* repatriate if and when they believe it is in their best interest to do so." (my italics). It would appear to be stretching the definition of *voluntary* to imply that refugees who have no choice but to return are participating in a truly voluntary repatriation. Refugees in this type of repatriation have no control over their *external* security context.

The emergence of the phenomenon of repatriation into conflict zones has not been without controversy. Several studies have been undertaken whose conclusions may appear to promote this type of return migration (Stein and Cuny 1995). Some academics have questioned the motivations of individuals and agencies that promote this type of return migration. Harrell-Bond (1989, p. 44) links the emergence of repatriation into conflict zones with the increased financial pressure being placed on UNHCR by many western governments. The long-term maintenance of refugees in organized settlements, which is increasingly the norm in Africa, is an expensive undertaking. On the other hand, repatriation exercises, while also expensive to donor nations, do have the added advantage that they 'solve' the refugee problem. Because of this, UNHCR has sometimes been co-opted into the promotion of voluntary repatriation as the primary solution for Africa's refugees, even when this entails returning them to areas of insecurity.

According to Harrell-Bond, the *de facto* acceptance by the UNHCR of the 'new conventional wisdom' (Stein *et al* 1995) regarding repatriation seriously affects its ability to act independently in its role as the international protector of refugees. She notes:

"Understandably, dependent as it is on the states which fund it, UNHCR cannot act as a neutral body with the necessary freedom of action to represent single-mindedly the interests of refugees when these interests do not conform with those of the states supporting it. ...Given that donors believe UNHCR-sponsored programs have failed to integrate refugees into the social and economic fabric of the countries of first asylum, why do they assume its involvement in the reintegration of returnees will be more successful? As would be true of any outside organization, UNHCR lacks the capacity to superintend the social and economic integration of returnees into their home society, and has no power to ensure their protection." (1989, p. 45).

Harrell-Bond therefore draws the conclusion that refugees must not be in any way coerced by the UNHCR or NGOs into returning to areas of conflict. Ideally the ultimate

solution of a refugee situation should be the resolution of the conflict that caused the refugees' flight (p. 61).

Despite the fact that the conflict might have ended, with the combatants having agreed to lay down their arms, there remain significant dangers to civilians returning to what was previously a war zone. Among the most insidious of these dangers are landmines. The aftermath of many African conflicts, particularly those in Angola, Mozambique and Somalia, has shown how devastating mine-fields can be to returning civilian population (Lloyd 1994, p. 33). In many cases, the mines were laid without being mapped or marked, rendering their eventual disposal more difficult. The example of Angola proves how difficult it can be to de-mine even a small portion of a country. During the thirty years of conflict in Angola, mines have been laid by the Portuguese, South Africans, Cubans and Zairians, as well as the two Angolan liberation fronts: UNITA and MPLA (Morrison 1991, p. 9). Because the mines were laid by so many different factions over so long a time, information regarding the placement of mines can be incomplete or unobtainable, making their location and disposal more difficult.

Following the cessation of hostilities in Mozambique, it was estimated that up to two million land-mines had been laid during the conflict. While initial clearance operations revealed fewer mines than had been expected, the effects of the widespread distribution of mines will be experienced for years by local populations (Drumtra 1994, p. 27). Mine awareness projects now form a part of many repatriation programs. In Zimbabwe and Malawi, Mozambican refugees have been trained how to recognize mines and potential mine fields before returning home (UNHCR 1993f, p. 3). This type of training program is an attempt to return some degree of control over their security situation directly to the refugees.

Economic Conditions at Home

The ability of refugees to grow enough food or earn enough money upon repatriation is central to their *external context*. Refugees who are given the opportunity to freely participate in the economy are more likely to view repatriation as an option. Included in the economic context are such issues as land availability and tenure, cross-border economic links and post-repatriation development schemes.

The Namibian repatriation experience provides an example of a lack of appropriate post-repatriation economic opportunity. Upon their return to Namibia, most refugees were provided with agricultural land upon which they were supposed to farm. While some refugees had previously lived in rural areas as farmers, a large proportion of the exiles had become urbanized during their exile and had integrated themselves into the urban lifestyle (Tapscott and Mulongeni 1990, p. 11). Upon their return, these former refugees had not expected to become farmers again. Many of these returnees did not have the required skills to become self-sufficient at agriculture and came to depend on friends and relatives for assistance. Others realized that the cities offered the best opportunity for cash employment and migrated to urban areas. Many refugees who returned to Namibia had been let down by a lack of vision in the initial development plans for the new country. The economic contexts of the refugees, most of whom had obtained wage employment in the cities, was overlooked in these plans. The refugees, who all returned home freely, were not given adequate control over their economic futures.

Returnees to Mozambique in the 1990s had to cope with a perceived lack of adequate agricultural land at home (Drumtra 1994, p. 29). The length of the conflict, combined with a previous unsuccessful land reorganization scheme had left the question of land tenure in doubt. Many refugees sent a member of the family home in advance in order to ensure that their former holdings had not been appropriated by

someone else. Many refugees would not consider returning home until they were assured of having sufficient land to support their families.


Infrastructure at Home

Closely linked to economic conditions at home is the quality of infrastructure in home areas. The conflicts that precipitate refugee migrations are frequently protracted and destructive to the regional infrastructure. With respect to repatriation, initially the most important part of the infrastructure are the roads upon which the refugees would travel home during their return. Official repatriation programs often transport large numbers of refugees from gathering points on one side of the border to their home areas on the other side. While early repatriates, usually those who have settled near the frontier, can make their way home without assistance, later repatriates in official programs often require transportation assistance (Meldrum 1994, p. 48). In order for this part of any repatriation exercise to be a success, the road and transportation infrastructure on both sides of the frontier must be maintained at a level that can support large motorised convoys. In areas where there has been fighting, bridges and other key road intersections may have been destroyed. The repair of these transportation points is essential for the success of the repatriation process.

The reconstruction of roads forms only a part of the infrastructure problem. In the longer term, the state of schools and health care clinics can be an essential component of the *external context*. Returnees to northern Uganda in the late 1980s were faced with rebuilding an infrastructure that had been damaged, or in many cases destroyed, after years of civil war. Schools and hospitals had been razed and the roads required to transport building materials had not been adequately maintained. Initial attempts by UNHCR to fund NGOs that were to provide the needed infrastructure upgrading were a failure. The UNHCR contracted with agencies that had little or no experience in Uganda or with refugees in general (Allen 1991, p. 21).

The *external context* is represented by Figure 4.2. Like the *social context*, the *external context* can be either *free* or *controlled*. This measurement is made by an analysis of the entire *context*, comparing the various components. Refugees whose *external context* is generally free are provided with an opportunity to resettle themselves without fear, in the hope of attaining self sufficiency in the near future. When the *external context* is controlled, refugees may not be presented with choices to allow them to return home voluntarily.

Figure 4.2 External Context



NEW TYPOLOGY OF REPATRIATION

There are three terms that are generally used to describe the return migration of refugees. The first, "voluntary repatriation", refers to a free and unhindered decision to return home. Recently however, the complete voluntariness of certain repatriations has been called into question. On the opposing side, "involuntary repatriation" implies that refugees have somehow been returned home without a choice. The word *refoulement* is the legal term frequently used to describe involuntary return-migration. Because these three terms generally have black-and-white connotations, they can prove problematic with respect to some more recent repatriations, where refugees may have had only minor, or no input into their return migration decision, while external factors have controlled the refugees ultimate destinies.

EXTERNAL CONTEXT Voluntary Expulsion Repatriation Controlled **SOCIAL SOCIAL** Free **CONTEXT** CONTEXT **Imposed** Coerced Repatriation Return **EXTERNAL CONTEXT** Involuntary Repatriation

Figure 4.3 Typology of Repatriation

The new typology of repatriation, outlined in Figure 4.3, uses the previously described *social* and *external contexts* as the primary test of voluntariness. The two *contexts* are 'crossed', giving four distinct types of repatriation. As is noted at the bottom of the Figure, three of these types of return migration are classified as *involuntary repatriation*, while only *voluntary repatriation* is classified as being

completely free. The four types of repatriation and the characteristics of the *contexts* involved are outlined below, while specific case studies of the types follow in the next chapter.

Voluntary Repatriation

When the refugees' external and social contexts are free, then the repatriation is considered voluntary. For the most part, the repatriations that follow the end of a liberation struggle against a colonial power are of the voluntary type. This type of repatriation is the most basic and has generally been the norm in Africa throughout most of the last forty years. The refugees are generally given completely free choice when and how to return home.

Social and External Context

Refugees whose *social contexts* are free are able to make an informed decision to return home. The refugees are granted the opportunity to remain in exile, no pressure is brought to bear on their immediate economic or security situations. Refugees who are members of vulnerable groups are provided with appropriate assistance to help them return home. The free *social context* allows refugees to control the timing and destination of their return.

A truly *voluntary repatriation* can not begin without a free exchange of information about home areas. Refugees who are well informed make the best decisions about their futures. Information about the important issues of security and economic conditions must be free of distortion from external agencies. Ideally during repatriations, external agencies such as NGOs and political parties/fronts will become active participants in transmitting timely and accurate information about home areas to those still in exile (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1994, p. 8).

In a *voluntary repatriation*, security issues at home should be resolved to the complete satisfaction of the refugees. Programs to identify and clear possible minefields should have been undertaken. Where necessary, development projects should be focused to provide repaired and upgraded infrastructure.

Involuntary Repatriation

In the context of the typology, a voluntary *repatriation* is clearly the most desirable. Refugees with free *social* and *external* contexts are able to return home at their own will and at their own pace, without fear of insecurity. While many repatriations in Africa have been truly *voluntary*, these have most often occurred following the end of a colonial occupation or a clearly defined conflict. Current conflicts in Africa have less well defined causes and end-points. The lack of solutions to these conflicts leads to repatriations where the motivations of the refugees, the governments and NGOs involved are not always the same.

Coerced Return

The first type of *involuntary repatriation* is *coerced return*. When refugees' social contexts are free, but their *external contexts* are controlled, then they are 'lured' home from exile. The refugees are given the free choice to remain in exile, but conditions at home are manipulated in some manner in order to provoke a return migration.

Social Context

Here the *social context* is similar to that of *voluntary repatriation*. The refugees are allowed free access to economic opportunities and markets, while security and environmental issues are not a concern. Kinship ties are maintained between refugees.

Families are allowed to settle as they wish. Most importantly, the refugees are welcome, or at least are not unwelcome by the local population and government.

External Context

It is the controlled *external context* that leads to the coerced return. While some governments are glad to be rid of refugees, other governments are embarrassed by the existence of large numbers of their citizens outside their borders. In the early 1980s, the government of Uganda was seeking to prove to the world that the protracted conflict there had ended. However, the large Ugandan refugee populations in Sudan and Zaire contradicted the official line that everything was back to normal (Crisp 1986a, p. 165). An information campaign was initiated to inform the refugees about conditions at home. The UNHCR and several NGOs were drawn into organizing a repatriation program for the refugees. Despite all the assurances of safety, the refugees, through their own sources, were aware of continued security problems in Uganda. Most refugees refused to return home. The government of Uganda had attempted to control the *external context* by spreading misinformation to the refugees. In addition, international organizations were co-opted into providing repatriation assistance to refugees who did not want to go home.

Expulsion

The second type of *involuntary repatriation* is *expulsion*. This occurs when a refugee's *social context* is sufficiently controlled, that they have little or no choice but to initiate a return migration. This type of return migration is often called *refoulement*. The term *expulsion* does not imply that refugees are forced at gun-point to return home, rather the emphasis is on the control exerted by external forces on refugees' *social contexts*.

Social Context

The lack of a free *social context* can be brought about by several means. Refugees who are denied access to land for cultivation, who have no other recourse for food are not able to make a free choice to return home. Refugees who live in camps and depend to a certain extent on food aid, can be controlled by the systematic reduction of rations or medical services. Frequently it is the most vulnerable refugees who are most susceptible to this type of situation. Vulnerable refugees who do not have extensive kin or social networks may have little recourse but to return home sooner than they might have liked. Early returnees tend to be those who are least well socially and economically adjusted to their lives in exile (Akol 1991, p. 25). If conditions in exile are poor enough, some vulnerable refugees may take the earliest opportunity to return to their home lands. Some of these refugees may be compelled to home return while conflict of some sort is still in progress (Cuny and Stein 1992, p. 13). These early returnees can affect the timing and motivation of other refugees who are considering returning home.

External Context

The uncontrolled *external context* of an *expulsion* means that refugees are generally free to settle in their homes. This is despite the fact that a conflict may still be in progress, or the regional economy and infrastructure may still not have recovered from a conflict. One outcome of *expulsion* can be an immediate return to exile if conditions at home prove to be unlivable. In this case the refugees run the risk of being very unwelcome in exile and receiving little or no assistance.

Imposed Repatriation

The final type of *involuntary repatriation* occurs when a both a refugee's *contexts* are controlled by external agencies. In this scenario, refugees are *expelled* and

coerced into returning home at the same time. Because they are not welcome on either side of the border, this type of repatriation is the most problematic. Refugees become pawns in a larger conflict that has not ended and perhaps shows little sign of ending. Imposed repatriation marks the failure of states, political fronts and the international community to find real solutions to the causes of refugee migrations.

Social and External Context

The controlled nature of both *contexts* means that the refugees are not necessarily provided with accurate information about home areas, or the opportunity to freely access appropriate information. The timing of the refugees' return is controlled by external forces, so the refugees are not able to co-ordinate their return with agricultural cycles. In addition, economic opportunities at home and in exile remain limited, providing refugees with the problem of earning sufficient money to pay for their return migration. There is the potential of continued conflict and continued insecurity in the home areas. Without appropriate development plans, infrastructure remains destroyed, providing additional problems for the new returnees.

Imposed repatriation represents the worst of both worlds for refugees. This type of repatriation does not meet the criteria for a 'durable solution'. The imposed return of refugees to a conflict zone is neither durable, nor a real solution. The likely outcome of imposed repatriation is continued instability, continued violence and continued refugee migrations.

SUMMARY

The typology of repatriation outlined in this chapter provides a new insight into return migration in Africa. While repatriation is normally divided into two dichotomous categories: 'voluntary repatriation' and 'involuntary repatriation', the new typology provides two 'in-between' options. The new types of repatriation can prove useful in

classifying the emerging phenomenon, whereby some elements of the repatriation appear to be free, while others do not. Many of the recent repatriations into zones of conflict, that have been described as 'voluntary' do not stand the test of the new typology. Refugees who may appear to freely choose to return to zones of conflict do so because one or both of their *contexts* is controlled by external agencies. Understanding the external control of these *contexts* is the essential starting point to understanding the three varieties of *involuntary repatriation*. The next chapter provides several case studies of repatriations and tests the new typology and its validity.