Hamartia and Hubris in the Story of Oedipus
by
Peter Haugen
Department of Modern & Classical Languages & Literatures
University of North Dakota, Grand Forks
Exposure,
salvation, murder, incest-many people today are familiar
with the major details of the story surrounding Oedipus,
details which invoke an odd mixture of horror and pity and
often spark heated debates regarding whether or not Oedipus
truly deserved his fate. Some scholars argue that he did
not deserve the life laid out before him, for how can a
man be held accountable for living out the fate decreed
for him by the gods before his birth? Others are equally
adamant in maintaining that he did deserve the mortifying
revelations he was forced to endure, pointing out that he
possessed one or more tragic flaws; therefore, even though
he may have been a good man and ruler overall, he
is still to blame for what happened to him (Dodds 17). Neither
of these most common views is entirely accurate, nor is
either view entirely inaccurate; while both arguments
contain some truth, neither view allows for the complexity
of the causes that ultimately led to the fate faced by Oedipus.
Those who would argue that Oedipus' fate was brought about by
one or several tragic flaws frequently refer to Aristotle's
Poetics, arguably the earliest and most influential
work of literary criticism. In his Poetics, Aristotle
notes "that the best sort of tragic hero is a man highly
esteemed and prosperous who falls into misfortune because
of some serious [.hamartia]" (Dodds 18). Traditionally,
hamartia has been identified either as being a "tragic
flaw"-a serious physical, psychological, or moral flaw in
an otherwise impeccable character-or as being directly caused
by such a flaw. For example, Laurence Berns states, "As
a result of a flaw natural to his kind, the tragic hero
harms and destroys those he loves most. It is those very
qualities for which he is admired and honored that cause
him to wreak great evils" (77). Oedipus, then, is said to
be a just and noble ruler who cares for his people as though
they were his own children. Indeed, Oedipus addresses the
citizens of Thebes as "children" in Sophocles' tragedy Oedipus
the King (111-113),
and he burns with an admirable passion to discover the truths
pertaining both to his own past and to the cause(s) behind
the plague besetting his city. Nevertheless, he is also
regarded as having a tremendous temper and a blindness to
the truth he wishes to ignore or in some way fears. A man
of great passions, Oedipus is destroyed by those very passions
and is to blame for his fate because he is plagued by these
tragic flaws.
Defining Aristotle's hamartia as simply a tragic flaw
of some sort or as caused by an individual's flaw, however,
fails to recognize that Aristotle uses this term in other
works to refer to something entirely different from a "tragic
flaw"; namely, he uses it "to mean an offense committed
in ignorance of some material fact and therefore free from
[poneria] (wickedness) or [kakia] (vice)"
[sic] (Dodds 19-20). For example, in his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
states: "Thus there are three kinds of injury in transactions;
those done in ignorance are mistakes when the person
acted on, the act, the instrument, or the end is other than
the agent supposed (1792). Similarly, he states in his Rhetoric,
"Equity must be applied to forgivable actions; and it must
make us distinguish between wrongdoings on the one hand,
and mistakes, or misfortunes, on the other" (2188).1
At this point, it is important to note that the phrasing Aristotle
uses here demands that mistakes be categorized as forgivable
actions rather than as actions that are caused by malicious
intent or by an evil nature. As Aristotle uses hamartia
thus in these two passages, it stands to reason that his
intended meaning in the Poetics is similar. The context
of the use of hamartia in the Poetics reinforces
just such an interpretation: the two examples Aristotle
provides of tragic heroes afflicted by hamartia are
first Oedipus, who murdered his father Laius and married
his mother Jocasta in complete ignorance of his relationship
to them, and while striving to avoid that very fate; and
second, Thyestes, who unwittingly ate his own children when
they were vilely butchered and secretly served to him by
Atreus (2325). Therefore, rather than implying some sort
of tragic flaw, Aristotle is arguing that a tragic hero's
hamartia, from which his destruction stems, is simply
his making a mistake, acting "in ignorance of some material
fact."
That hamartia does not necessarily stem directly from
a tragic flaw is further upheld by Sophocles' portrayal
of the virtually tyrannical temper unleashed by Oedipus
against both Creon and Tiresias
(Oedipus the King 124-140).2
This scene has been used by many as proof that, among other
things, this violent temper is a tragic flaw afflicting
Oedipus (Kitto 38). That Sophocles does not intend this
interpretation is made clear from the casual manner in which
Creon dismisses the outburst near the conclusion of the
play when he says, "Oedipus, I've come not so that I might
laugh at you nor taunt you with evil of the past" (171).3
The actions which have led to the fulfillment of the fate
of Oedipus have not directly stemmed from a tragic
flaw within the character of Oedipus. Sophocles makes it
clear that such personal characteristics as a violent temper-characteristics
which, quite frankly, are neither uncommon nor found only
within a tragic hero-are a source neither of misfortune
nor of a character's resulting defilement in
and of themselves, for such a source could not be so casually
dismissed by Creon, and thus, by implication, Sophocles
himself, at the conclusion of the play (114-115).
While Aristotle's use of hamartia in reference to such
tragic heroes as Oedipus negates any argument that he insists
on a tragic flaw being necessarily the direct cause of the
horrors faced by those heroes, those who would argue that
Oedipus is to blame for what befalls him are not entirely
mistaken. Similarly, those that claim that Oedipus is simply
a pawn in the arbitrary maneuverings of the gods are not
entirely correct. An examination of the story of Oedipus
reveals that, in addition to Oedipus himself, Laius and
Jocasta are equally at fault. These three characters possess
a tremendous hubris, that is, they are guilty of
an overbearing pride that insists they can sidestep the
fate decreed for them by the gods themselves. This pride
is first made evident in Laius and Jocasta's exposure of
Oedipus when he was still an infant.
It is vital at this point that modern readers understand the
cultural background surrounding the exposure of infants
in ancient Greece in order to understand in what way the
exposure of Oedipus pours blame for the fulfillment of their
fate upon the heads of Laius and Jocasta. The exposure of
newborn infants, who had not yet been recognized as members
of the family, was a commonly accepted practice in ancient
Greece, even though the Greeks outlawed infanticide, the
killing of children who had been legally admitted into a
family (Patterson 103-105).
According to Fullan, although there is evidence that some
physically handicapped individuals were highly regarded
by the ancient Greeks, it is generally accepted that among
the more routine reasons for the exposure of an infant was
deformity or other physical defects (Patterson 113). That
exposure was endorsed by Greek society is evidenced by such
ancient injunctions as Aristotle's statement, "As to the
exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that
no deformed child shall live" (Politics 2119), and
Plato's comment, "[T]he offspring of the inferior, and any
of those of the other sort who are born defective, [officials]
will properly dispose of in secret [.]" (699).4
The common acceptability of the practice of infant exposure
in ancient Greek society necessarily indicates that the
exposure of the infant Oedipus would not have been abhorrent
to ancient minds and cannot be seen as being an act of hubris
in and of itself. The act of exposing the infant did not
rebel against any mandates believed to have been instituted
by the gods.
While Laius and Jocasta's exposing of Oedipus did not constitute
hubris, the motivation behind that action did: the
driving purpose was, quite simply, to avoid the fate that
had been prophesied by the oracle given to Laius (Morford
and Lenardon 298). This willful attempt by Laius and Jocasta
to raise themselves above the decrees of the gods constituted
the most blasphemous form of hubris, for no human
can ignore the gods' will; the exposure of Oedipus was simply
a manifestation of that most serious form of hubris.
In like manner, Oedipus himself was guilty of hubris
as he also attempted to thwart the fate that had been decreed
for him by the gods, thereby implicitly claiming to be above
the gods themselves. When Oedipus traveled from Corinth
to Delphi in order to learn his true parentage, rather than
receiving the information he sought, he was instead informed
that he was fated to murder his father and marry his mother.
In an effort to thwart the will of the gods and evade this
fate prophesied by them for him, he refused to return to
the only home he had ever known and thereby hoped to avoid
interaction with either of the individuals whom he believed
to be his parents. Through that act of disobedience, he
unwittingly set his feet on the path that would eventually
lead him to fulfilling the very decree he was striving to
foil.
Interestingly, it is additional hubris, made evident
through a series of acts long after Oedipus had already
murdered his true father and married his true mother, that
leads him to discover the horrifying truth of what he has
done. Sophocles, in his masterpiece Oedipus the King,
vividly portrays the blindness of Oedipus, caused by his
pride, as he refuses to acknowledge the truth revealed by
Tiresias, the mouthpiece of the gods, taking his disbelief
so far as to threaten both Tiresias and Creon, both of whom
had honestly sought the will of the gods. His refusal forces
the gods to explicitly reveal the truth of what he has done,
thereby instigating the suicide of his mother-wife and his
own self-mutilation and subsequent life-long suffering (111-176).
Both of these acts become final manifestations of hubris,
for both acts claim for mortals the authority of the gods
over the continuation and quality of life.
The hubris of Oedipus necessitates the placement of at
least some of the blame for his fate upon his own shoulders.
The attribution of such blame is substantiated by Sophocles'
Antigone, which makes it clear that "prophecy in
no way compels but only predicts" (Kitto 41). Indeed, Oedipus'
hubris can quite legitimately be recognized as a
tragic flaw in his character, a flaw which indirectly results
in the fulfillment of prophecy. Aristotle's understanding
of hamartia does not deny the possibility of such
a flaw; rather, he allows that a tragic flaw is not necessarily
a direct cause of hamartia, and thus accepts that
other aspects of an individual's character can constitute
a tragic flaw rather than simply the one which led directly
to the actions in question.
That Oedipus is in part to blame for the fulfillment of the
fate decreed for him by the gods and for his resulting personal
contamination before the gods, exemplified in the plague
that is afflicting Thebes at the beginning of Oedipus
the King (114-115),
is clearly seen when one recognizes his hubris. However,
Sophocles makes abundantly clear that neither Oedipus' hubris
nor his personal contamination which results from the prophetic
fulfillment is nearly so damning as those who would place
all of the blame on the shoulders of Oedipus frequently
claim. Not only is Oedipus finally absolved, he is so completely
purified that the gods see fit to grant him deification,
transforming him into a protector of Attica and summoning
him themselves into the afterlife (Sophocles, Oedipus
at Colonus 177-187).
Such an action on the part of the gods would never have
occurred had Oedipus still been unredeemed.
Both a clear understanding of Aristotle's use of hamartia
and a careful examination of the chronicle of Oedipus are
necessary to achieve an accurate picture of the part Oedipus
plays in the realization of the fate decreed for him before
his birth. He cannot be blamed for acts committed in ignorance,
but neither can he be fully absolved of guilt when his own
hubris is a link in that chain of events which ultimately
leads to the prophetic fulfillment. The myth of Oedipus
raises a question that has been considered in both philosophy
and religion for centuries: do the gods cause our fates
to be fulfilled, or are they simply observers who proclaim
the inevitable results of our own actions? Perhaps the truth
lies somewhere between these two extremes; for, while "prophecy
in no way compels but only predicts," would predicted fates
be realized if humanity were not informed and did not attempt
to thwart those fates?
Notes
1
I am indebted to E.R. Dodds for directing me to the specific
passages which I have here referenced from the Nicomachean
Ethics and Rhetoric.
2 I am indebted to H.D.F.
Kitto for directing me to this passage.
3 Again, I am indebted
to H.D.F. Kitto for directing me to this passage.
4 I am indebted to Michael
R. Fullan for directing me to the specific passages which
I have here referenced from the Politics
and the Republic.
______________________________________________________________________________
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